

CHINA PAPERS  
No. 9

C I C

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL  
CONSEIL INTERNATIONAL DU CANADA

BRIDGING “FORBIDDEN” AND  
“TRUE NORTH” NATIONS:  
TAIWAN’S AGENCY IN  
CANADA’S CHINA POLICY

**Der-yuan Wu**

March 2010

Canadian International Council  
[www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org](http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org)

Conseil international du Canada  
[www.conseilinternationalducanda.org](http://www.conseilinternationalducanda.org)

## ABSTRACT

Taiwan (the Republic of China), regardless of its administration, has, broadly speaking, sought to affect Canada's China policy by aiming to be treated as a distinct entity deserving equal and dignified status, with or without reference to the People's Republic of China. This paper explores the various methods, issue areas, and key themes in Taiwan's management of its relations with Canada, with varying emphases across administrations since the early 1990s.

When Taiwan has tried to affect the course of Sino-Canadian relations, it has been mainly in the legitimate context of an effort to gain some kind of recognition as an autonomous entity apart from and not subject to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, Taiwan's efforts to gain attention from both the Canadian government and the Canadian public have led Taiwan to stress common values and commitments in ways that have in turn affected Taiwan's own evolution as a democratic polity; and Taiwan's promotion of substantive relations with Canada in several issue domains has also shaped its engagement with other countries in various ways. These developments are demonstrated in some international aspects of Taiwan's higher education and science and technology policies as well as in much of its aboriginal policy. In the course of policy development, Taiwan's priorities in regard to the mainland-international nexus and its guiding themes of economic prosperity, democracy, and human rights have varied from administration to administration.

## RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude soutient que Taiwan, quels que soient les gouvernements qui s'y sont succédé, a globalement tenté d'influer sur la politique chinoise du Canada en cherchant à être traité comme une entité distincte et digne de la même considération que la Chine, avec ou sans référence à celle-ci. Elle passe en revue les différents moyens, secteurs d'intérêt et thèmes clés autour desquels Taiwan a géré ses relations avec le Canada depuis le début des années 1990, avec une intensité variable selon ses gouvernements.

Mais si Taiwan a effectivement tenté d'agir sur les relations sino-canadiennes, ajoute-t-on, ce fut généralement dans l'intention légitime d'être reconnu comme État autonome non assujéti à la souveraineté de la République populaire de Chine. Parallèlement, ces efforts visant à retenir l'attention d'Ottawa et de la population canadienne ont incité Taiwan à privilégier des valeurs et des engagements communs, ce qui a influencé en retour son évolution en tant que constitution politique démocratique tout en favorisant dans plusieurs dossiers ou secteurs la création de liens significatifs avec le Canada, lesquels ont agi de façon variable sur ses engagements à l'égard d'autres pays. En témoignent certains éléments internationaux des politiques taiwanaises d'enseignement supérieur, de science et de technologies. En ce qui touche également l'élaboration des politiques, les priorités de la jonction intérieure-internationale et les grandes orientations de prospérité économique, l'accent mis sur la démocratie et les droits de la personne ont manifestement varié d'un gouvernement taiwanais à l'autre.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Der-yuan Wu is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei and currently is Visiting Research Associate at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. He received his PhD in Political Science from Carleton University. His research areas include institutions, ideas in policy process and relationships between Beijing, Ottawa, Taipei and Washington. He has published his research in various Taiwanese journals as well as a book in Chinese. His recent English works include a book chapter in *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis* edited by Andre Lecours (University of Toronto Press, 2005) and an article in *Issues & Studies* (2008), and has delivered papers at various yearly conferences hosted by the Canadian Political Science Association and the International Studies Association.

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Canadian International Council, its Senate or its Board of Directors.

If you would like to download a copy of this report please visit [www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org](http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org)

If you would like to be added to our mailing list or have questions about our publications please contact:  
[info@canadianinternationalcouncil.org](mailto:info@canadianinternationalcouncil.org)

ISSN 1921-9865 (Online) ISSN 1921-9881 (Print)

© 2010 Canadian International Council

---

This paper was sponsored by the Canadian International Council and commissioned through Professor Jeremy T. Paltiel. My greatest gratitude should thus be expressed for their kind sponsorship. In the research process, it benefited from Dr. Paltiel's invaluable comments and the assistance of various Canadian and Taiwanese individuals and institutions. I deeply appreciated their generous support and candidness in sharing their viewpoints, although I alone bear the responsibility for the accuracy and representation of the information they offered. In addition to officials who preferred to remain anonymous, the following people and institutions must be acknowledged: Thomas Adams, Diana Chen, Barbara Czarnecki, Myles Hulme, Pitman Potter, Bo Tedards, Jeffrey Watson, Sylvia Yan, Maysing Yang, the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, the Council of Indigenous Peoples, the Republic of China Ministry of Education, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. Also, both the Division of Chinese Politics, Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei, and the Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, have provided hospitable settings for the completion of this paper.

## INTRODUCTION

In the context of the People's Republic of China's rise and the waning hegemony of the United States, Canada, like other states in the world, has found it necessary to review its China policy. New policy initiatives by Stephen Harper's government, such as sending International Trade Minister Stockwell Day to Beijing,<sup>1</sup> a visit by Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon,<sup>2</sup> and finally a visit by Prime Minister Harper in December 2009, show signs of a policy readjustment after the 2008 federal election. But a rational and comprehensive Canadian policy toward China cannot be developed without taking into account the Taiwan factor. The factual existence of the island state (the Republic of China) was a "problem" during much of the Cold War era for both the normalization of Canada-China relations and the development of Canadian-American ties. At the time, insofar as four-party relations were concerned, Canada often confined its interactions simply to the United States or China and had little direct communication with Taiwan, especially after de-recognition in 1970. On some occasions, Canada's policy actions were frustrated by the Taiwan factor, as illustrated by the episode of Taipei's participation in the 1976 Montreal Olympics. In the contemporary context, with Chinese ascendancy and an ongoing dramatic cross-Strait rapprochement that is changing the contours of the Asia-Pacific security community, Ottawa's interests would be better served by paying more attention to Taipei's perspective as well as Taiwan's policy toward Canada.

As a fundamental issue encountered in practical diplomacy, the maintenance or promotion of relationships with particular countries is often imbued with a realist policy orientation. According to a common-sense assumption, allocation of diplomatic resources is inevitably selective, and resources thus should be aimed primarily at improving ties with great powers rather than with other states of equal or lower rank. As an interesting parallel, in many foreign policy analyses, the relationships between less-than-great powers, especially those with a dyadic special linkage to a neighbouring great power, are often neglected.<sup>3</sup> The relationship between Taiwan and Canada, in the context of their respective connections with China and the United States, is the very case in point. Since there are only a few great powers in the world and relationships among less-than-great powers constitute another important but often overlooked part of international relations, they deserve more attention.

The case of Canada-Taiwan relations is part of the broader "one China" problem, and the interactions between the two less-than-great powers may cast new light on how unofficial and soft power diplomacy is undertaken in areas where the "high politics" issue might be invoked. Against this backdrop, some questions may arise: Is there a distinct Canada policy for Taiwan? Or is Taiwan's Canada policy simply "business as usual"? Has Taiwan tried to swing Canada's China/Taiwan policy in its own favour? (It should be noted that while some of Taiwan's policy initiatives toward Canada might ultimately target Beijing either directly or indirectly, others might not be readily reduced to this goal, or might be tarnished by "ulterior motives.") If so, how can this be demonstrated? Are there guiding themes or principles that are related to the development of Taiwan's foreign policy toward Canada? Can a transformation of policy discourses across administrations be discerned?

This paper assumes that Taiwan, regardless of its administration, has, broadly speaking, sought to affect Canada's China policy, by aiming to be treated as a distinct entity deserving equal and dignified status, with or without reference to China. In addressing how Taipei attempts to affect Canada's China/Taiwan policy, it explores the various methods, issue areas, and key themes in Taiwan's management of its relations with Canada, with varying emphases across administrations since the early 1990s. This requires, first, a sketch of overall bilateral relations in a historical context. Then the paper focuses upon the contemporary setting and seeks to identify the major themes and functional areas of Taiwan-Canada relations and the approaches by which Taipei constructs, maintains, or strengthens its ties with Canada. Changes in priorities are traced through three

---

<sup>1</sup> Wheeler, "China Becomes the Great Wall"; Lee-Young, "Canada Warms Up."

<sup>2</sup> Mackinnon, "Canada Resumes 'Quiet Diplomacy'"; Clark, "Cannon Lays Groundwork."

<sup>3</sup> This predisposition was highlighted in a literature review in relation to Canada and Taiwan in my unpublished thesis; Wu, "Institutional Development and Adaptability." For its updated and reformulated publication in Chinese, see Wu, *International Constitution*.

successive governments in Taiwan. To demonstrate both change and continuity, the paper examines aboriginal affairs, education and science and technology; economic and trade policy are excluded only because of space limitations. The paper then explores the direction in which the engagement and influence have flowed, from either side of the Pacific; examines the distinctiveness of Taiwan's Canada policy; and discusses the bilateral relationship in light of Taiwan's mainland-international policy linkage.

The paper draws mostly from Taiwan government agency publications, relevant website sources, and interviews with Taipei government officials, incumbent or retired. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is obviously the key organization responsible for the governance of bilateral relations, and its *Republic of China Diplomatic Almanac* records in detail the meetings, exchanges, official visits, and other developments in Taiwan's public diplomacy.<sup>4</sup> Other Taiwanese government agencies, including the Ministry of Education (MOE), the National Science Council (NSC), and the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP), are also involved in the institutionalization of bilateral ties with Canada in their respective functional areas and have also yielded information for this paper.

## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Both before and after the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) government relocated itself in Taiwan in December 1949, Canada was on the brink of recognizing the Communist regime in Beijing. The eruption of the Korean War put the Canadian plan on hold, however;<sup>5</sup> and until Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations were formally established in 1970, the Nationalists continued to maintain a diplomatic presence in Canada. The Canadian government had never set up any representation in Taipei, however, and before the de-recognition, Canadian ties with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were, as a Department of External Affairs officer put it at the time, "friendly but not intimate relations."<sup>6</sup> Much of Taipei's effort during this time was aimed at influencing Canada's China policy to accept the Nationalists' position as representing China to the world. Taipei's major concerns were to increase Canada's support for its claim to the "China seat" in the United Nations, to bring about an expansion of diplomatic or consular representation in Canada, and to persuade Ottawa to set up an embassy on the island.

On October 13, 1970, Canada established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), with a formula by which Ottawa recognized Beijing as the sole legal government of China while taking note of the Chinese position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. From then on, Ottawa no longer recognized Taipei as the locus of the Chinese government. In the aftermath of the breakup, bilateral relations went through a period of turmoil, with disputes often revolving around the display of the Nationalist official nomenclature and other relevant symbols on Canadian soil. This notably culminated in the mid-1970s crisis over Taiwan's participation in the 1976 Montreal Olympics.<sup>7</sup> During these turbulent years, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, some of the Canadian diplomatic establishment – obviously assuming Taipei's foreign policy was made by a unitary set of individuals or organizations – held that the Nationalists were deliberately capitalizing upon all available opportunities to politicize bilateral relations through the display of ROC symbols in order to sabotage the newly established Sino-Canadian diplomatic ties. These symbols were present when Taipei participated directly in Canadian trade fairs, book fairs, or international conferences as well as when it indirectly sponsored activities undertaken by the local Chinese-Canadian community or visits by Taiwanese cultural troupes.

---

<sup>4</sup> The MOFA *Diplomatic Almanac*, in Chinese, was published annually in print through 1996 and has been published online since 1997 at [http://www.mofa.gov.tw/web\\_UTF-8/almanac](http://www.mofa.gov.tw/web_UTF-8/almanac). The almanac is cited in this paper only when a specific page is of note.

<sup>5</sup> Beecroft, "Canadian Policy," 49-52; Ronning, *Memoir of China*, 171-75; Wu, "Institutional Development and Adaptability," 95-97.

<sup>6</sup> National Archives of Canada, Department of External Affairs file 20-1-2-Taiwan, Part 1.2, Vol. 10057: Memorandum for Minister, May 12, 1966.

<sup>7</sup> Wu, "Institutional Development and Adaptability," 255-92.

On the other hand, from the time of de-recognition to the early 1990s, Canada-Taiwan relations were transformed and directed into several functional “low politics” domains, primarily through unofficial channels, with discrete, typically individual-based or trade-related organizational forms of representation. For Taipei, this sort of representation was performed by the Central News Agency, the Far East Trade Service, or the Chunghwa Chamber of Commerce, whereas for Ottawa, the comparable function was served by individual Canadians living in Taiwan, the Canadian Society,<sup>8</sup> or Canada’s Chamber of Commerce. The main parts of this representation were reassembled through the establishment of the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT) in 1986 and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Canada in 1991.<sup>9</sup> Since then, bilateral relations between Canada and Taiwan have been in their contemporary phase.

## TAIPEI’S POLICY OBJECTIVES AND “HIGH POLITICS” ISSUES: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Arguably, it is in the contemporary phase of development that Taiwan is genuinely able to expand and institutionalize substantive ties with Canada with fuller agency. From Taipei’s perspective, the establishment of a TECO office in Ottawa in 1992-93 was an unprecedented milestone after the Canadian de-recognition in 1970. It brought many of the previously discrete domains of representation back under the umbrella of a consolidated organizational framework in which the functions of public, consular, economic, cultural, information, and technological affairs, nearly identical to those of an official embassy, are performed. It provided a solid organizational basis enabling Taipei to broaden and deepen bilateral exchanges, as well as to coordinate its efforts across various policy sectors.

The opening of TECO Canada was achieved when President Lee Teng-hui of the KMT was in his first presidency. After the KMT lost in the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came into office. When in power, the DPP government became more and more aggressive in pushing forward Taiwan’s international visibility. Taiwan’s profile in Canada was raised accordingly. Eight years later, Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT took over the state mechanism again and adopted a new approach that departed significantly from those of his predecessors. This section deals first with overarching policy objectives and personnel deployment for representation during these three administrations.

Obviously, Taiwan’s new form of representation in Canada through the TECO mechanism would not be working effectively without some fundamental guiding institutional framework having been put in place. In other words, the general objectives of Taiwanese foreign policy have set the parameters for governing its ties with Canada. The overall policy objective specifies what is to be pursued. As divergent values underlay the agendas among the Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou governments, the priorities of Taiwan’s policy toward Canada changed accordingly. Although there is some thread of continuity in such policy goals as “expanding or enhancing substantive ties with the outside world,” including the similarity of measures taken across such policy domains as economic, education, and technological affairs, the primary themes or policy discourses highlighted and the approaches adopted generally varied in the three administrations.

---

<sup>8</sup> The Canadian Society in Taiwan (<http://www.canadiansociety.org>) was created in 1983 by a group of Canadians, in response to the absence of official Canadian representation in Taiwan at that time. In 1984, the Canadian Society was officially registered with the Ministry of Interior as a foreign association – the first of its kind in Taiwan.

<sup>9</sup> In March 1991, TECO Canada was first established in Toronto. One month later, TECO Vancouver was set up. Another TECO office in Ottawa was formed in July 1992. Then, in August 1993, TECO Canada was relocated to Ottawa. Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1994, 235-36. Some representation continued through other institutions as well, including the Central News Agency, the Taiwan Trade Center (successor of the Far East Trade Service), and the Canadian Society.

In the preface of the 1994 *Diplomatic Almanac*, “freedom, democracy, human rights and economic development” were identified as universal values in the world. This highlighted reference provided the primary rationale for Taiwan’s foreign policy initiatives at the time. In these years, constitutional reform and economic development were not only underscored as major domestic goals, but were also translated into international policy, aiming to promote substantive ties based upon Taiwan’s achievement in both realms. Meanwhile, “improving cross-Strait relations and pursuing rights to participate in international organizations and affairs” were also accentuated as main tasks.<sup>10</sup> These have provided the *raison d’être* for Taiwan’s bids for participation in the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO)<sup>11</sup> since 1993 and 1997, respectively. In 1997-98, the Lee Teng-hui government set policy goals to uphold the “democratic idea to safeguard peace in the Taiwan Strait” and to use “economic and trade [relations] to promote pragmatic diplomacy.”<sup>12</sup>

TECO Canada, under the leadership of Jason Yuan and Fang Chin-yen for the Lee Teng-hui administration, sought to promote Taiwan’s standing as deserving dignified international participation based on its achievements of economic prosperity and democracy. Through sponsoring various forums, speeches, or activities, TECO Canada gained support for its causes by mobilizing local Chinese-Canadian community members as well as targeting a selective audience in policy and academic circles, albeit using relatively low-profile methods. In particular, Fang, who had served as deputy foreign minister before taking the post in Canada, was instrumental in building momentum for Taiwan’s UN bid in the early 1990s, “hoping to create a condition where Taipei could co-exist equally with Beijing in international society [and] thereby benefiting cross-the-Strait relations.”<sup>13</sup> In some sense, this meant Taiwan’s international policy at the time was not subsumed by its mainland policy. In his tenure at TECO Canada, not surprisingly, Fang continued to pursue the cause of the UN bid and WHO participation. He also sought to assert Taiwan’s *de facto* sovereignty status, albeit in a low-key way, notably by stressing Taiwan’s primary jurisdiction in the controversial *Maersk Dubai* incident of 1996.<sup>14</sup> In helping settle the case, Fang tactfully instructed his delegates not to challenge the legality in court of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s arrest of Taiwanese crews after the ship docked in Halifax. Instead, his agents appealed to the stipulation in the law of the sea that the flag state possesses primary jurisdiction in the high seas – a move that highlighted, if indirectly, the *de facto* sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan – while promising that the Taiwanese crews would be put on trial fairly in the courts of the island state.<sup>15</sup>

As the Lee Teng-hui government left office in 2000, the relatively low-key approach of defending Taiwan’s *de facto* independence as well as accentuating its democratization and its economic achievement in order to build international support yielded to more aggressive strategies adopted by the DPP government. The Chen Shui-bian government put a much greater focus on promoting democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights as major policy objectives that were closely linked to and extended from the administration’s domestic initiatives. While the Lee administration had tended to stress Taiwan’s achievements in economic development and political democratization as dual common denominators on the basis of which Canada-Taiwan bilateral relations could be enhanced, the Chen government was inclined to put more emphasis on themes that usually contain greater political connotations, such as democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights, and it proposed that both sides could learn from each other’s experiences. It should be noted that some of the key themes stressed by the DPP government had actually already been identified as potential terrains for bilateral cooperation since the mid-1990s. Cooperation between Canada and Taiwan on aboriginal affairs, which is to be elaborated further in the

---

<sup>10</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1994, 3.

<sup>11</sup> Taiwan “has been seeking to participate in the WHO since 1997 [and has] also consistently set observership at the World Health Assembly as an important goal”; Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Taiwan’s Request.” The World Health Assembly (WHA) is the supreme decision-making body for WHO.

<sup>12</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1998, preface.

<sup>13</sup> Yi, “Exemplar Persists,” 94.

<sup>14</sup> The incident in March 1996 drew much international attention. Crewmen on the vessel claimed that its Taiwanese officers had thrown stowaways overboard. The Dalhousie University libraries collected much information on the incident and its follow-up in Collection No. MS-8-203; [http://www.library.dal.ca/DUASC/FindingAids/MS\\_8\\_203/#a0](http://www.library.dal.ca/DUASC/FindingAids/MS_8_203/#a0).

<sup>15</sup> Yi, “Exemplar Persists,” 96; Hsia, “Setting Exemplar.”

next section, is a case in point. To be brief, although the two countries reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Aboriginal Affairs Cooperation in late 1998, its implementation was less evident in Lee's last two years in office. Nevertheless, it was during the Chen administration from 2000 to 2008 that much more comprehensive and deeper mutual exchanges were undertaken and witnessed in this domain.

Aboriginal affairs indeed stood far out as a distinct area where the DPP government could boast of real practice in democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights. In many ways, the relatively high profile of the issue area in the DPP years was related to domestic Taiwanese politics and its international engagement. The DPP's emphasis on aboriginal affairs was closely connected to Taiwan's identity politics and the indigeneity of Taiwan as a whole, and it was used as a way of setting Taiwan's identity apart from China's.<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that among the domains of Taiwanese international engagement in the multilateral setting, aboriginal affairs had scored high visibility long before. For example, Taiwan's activities in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), where DPP supporters had long been present, gave an international dimension to the deprivation of sovereign rights with which other indigenous peoples across the globe could identify, thus collectively promoting their common cause. This was a real boon for Taiwan, as Taiwanese indigenous delegates' participation in annual meetings of the Working Groups on Indigenous Populations in the UN Human Rights Commission could be traced to as early as 1988 and the delegations had become even more active in the mid-1990s. These working groups also provided Taiwanese aboriginal delegates, led by Icyang Parod, a unique UN-level forum in which to lash out against the PRC's missile tests around Taiwan in 1996.<sup>17</sup>

Since the improvement of aboriginal living and cultural conditions constitutes one of the legitimate realms of human rights, and would demonstrate the practice of plural democracy and multiculturalism in Taiwan, the Chen government naturally identified and promoted aboriginal affairs and human rights together as primary areas where Taiwan could share values with Western democracies. The Chen administration expected its endeavours in these domains would at least be appreciated and recognized by the international community, including Canada. Various policy actions taken from 2000 to 2008 indicated the primary importance the Chen government attached to democracy and human rights as well as the vital role played by aboriginal affairs. For example, the administration appointed ambassadors at large on aboriginal affairs<sup>18</sup> and human rights and encouraged frequent mutual visits of aboriginal or human rights delegations between Canada and Taiwan. At the institutional level there were exchanges between think tanks on such themes as human security, the formation of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), and the establishment of the Democratic Pacific Union (DPU).

In September 2001, Taiwan's human rights delegation, including two ambassadors at large and the deputy minister of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs (renamed the Council of Indigenous Peoples in March 2002), visited the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Subjects of discussion included general human rights and the rights of women and aboriginal and disabled people.<sup>19</sup> The following March, the chief commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Michelle Falardeau-Ramsay, in turn made a visit to Taiwan.<sup>20</sup> The establishment of the TFD in June 2003 was a milestone for Chen's human rights and democracy diplomacy. As the first national democracy assistance foundation in Asia, the TFD aimed to "consolidate and transform Taiwan's democracy [and] keep in step with international democratic processes to spread Taiwan's democratic experience."<sup>21</sup> In international networking, the TFD played an active role in inviting well-known international democratic leaders, including former U.S. president Bill Clinton, former Polish president Lech Walesa, and former South Korean

---

<sup>16</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOFA official on April 21, 2009. Jeremy Paltiel also rightly highlighted this point in his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

<sup>17</sup> Parod, "Participation Report."

<sup>18</sup> The first to take the post was Masegeseg Z. Gagu.

<sup>19</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 2001, 221.

<sup>20</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 2002, 231-32.

<sup>21</sup> Jin-pyng Wang, TFD chairperson and Legislative Yuan speaker, remarks on the first-anniversary celebration, in "Taiwan Foundation for Democracy," a short pamphlet introducing the TFD.

president Kim Young-sam; initiating the World Forum for Democratization in Asia in 2005 and the Initiative and Referendum Institute-Asia in 2006; and participating in the Community of Democracies and the World Movement for Democracy.<sup>22</sup> It also established the Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award.<sup>23</sup>

On October 31, 2003, en route to Central America for a state visit, Chen Shui-bian received an award from the International League for Human Rights and made a speech in New York, which symbolized and culminated his human rights diplomacy. Moreover, to highlight Taiwan's human rights accomplishments regarding the international disabled community, the First Lady of Taiwan Career Award was created; it was presented on the 11th annual United Nations International Day of Disabled Persons.<sup>24</sup> In mid-August 2004, the Democratic Pacific Conference, initiated by Vice-President Annette Lu, was held to build ties among legislators of democracies in the Pacific basin, and it concluded with the Pacific Declaration. One year after, the DPU was formed in Taipei. Canadian parliamentarians, led by Mac Harb, were invited for the ceremony and became members of the newly established organization. In January and May 2005, President Chen Shui-bian visited Taiwan's allies in the South Pacific. This trip not only revealed Taipei's intensifying diplomatic manoeuvring in the region but also served as a prelude to an aboriginal-centred Austronesian diplomacy. In 2005 alone, a large number of diplomatic initiatives related to democracy and human rights were undertaken for this purpose.<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile, the Chen government's support for the cause of democracy won much appreciation from the Canadian Coalition for Democracy (CCD), founded in 2003, which was critical of the federal government's failure to support such sister democracies as India, Israel, and Taiwan. Before and after Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005, the CCD made statements to support Taiwan and urged Prime Minister Paul Martin's Liberal government to review its "one China" policy. This position was illustrated in a speech given by CCD's president, Alastair Gordon, during a "Support Taiwan" rally in Toronto in March. Later, on November 1, 2005, Gordon and his colleagues testified at hearings on the Taiwan Affairs Act before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.<sup>26</sup> In 2006-07, moreover, the TFD became a must-visit institution for Canadian delegations of parliamentarians and scholars; such delegations were seldom seen after the transfer of power in May 2008.<sup>27</sup> The DPP government's democracy diplomacy culminated in an initiative at the Global Forum on New Democracies, which was proposed by Chen Shui-bian himself. It concluded with a gathering of former presidents of Bulgaria, South Korea, Poland, South Africa, El Salvador, Mongolia, and Romania on January 26, 2007.<sup>28</sup>

Academic or think tank exchanges on democracy and human-rights-related themes were often undertaken from 2000 to 2008. For example, in December 2002, the Institutes of International Relations at both National Chengchi University and the University of British Columbia held a Conference on Human Security. The Canadian participants included Professors Paul Evans and Brian Job. Almost at the same time, members of Canadian think tanks, including Professors Bernie Frolic, Jacob Kovalio, and Richard Guisso, visited Taiwan. One year later, an academic delegation led by Professor Victor Carl Falkenheim followed suit. In the heyday of the DPP's democracy diplomacy in 2005, Thomas Axworthy, the chair of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen's University, was invited to visit Taiwan.

<sup>22</sup> The Community of Democracies was established in 1999 by the governments of Chile, the Czech Republic, India, Mali, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, and the United States. The TFD was invited to participate in 2005. The World Movement for Democracy was initiated by the US National Endowment for Democracy in 1999.

<sup>23</sup> Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, "5th Anniversary."

<sup>24</sup> "Ralph Meehan Wins."

<sup>25</sup> In the *Diplomatic Almanac*, MOFA estimated there were approximately 173 initiatives, including interparliamentary diplomacy, in total.

<sup>26</sup> Gordon, "CCD Speech"; Gordon's evidence before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 1, 2005, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2077985&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=38&Ses=1>.

<sup>27</sup> These delegations included those of parliamentarians led by Stephen Owen, Barry Devolin, Donald Boudria, and Fabian Manning as well as scholars, namely Andrew Cohen, David Harris, Judith Ann Nagatz, and T.V. Paul.

<sup>28</sup> Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, "5th Anniversary."

The Chen government also seized upon the outbreak of SARS in both Canada and Taiwan to push for Canadian support for Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization, or its supreme decision-making body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), beginning in 2003.<sup>29</sup> The House of Commons and the Senate passed non-binding resolutions to support Taiwan's observer status in the WHA on May 27 and June 12, 2003, respectively. In the following year, Canadian MPs continued to press the federal government to support Taiwan's participation. This prompted the Canadian delegate to the WHA to make explanatory statements on May 17, 2004. In November, a Canadian government representative also spoke in favour of observer status for Taiwan when the WHO deliberated upon an amendment to International Health Regulations (IHR). Next year, Canadian MPs continued to pass resolutions to support Taiwan's participation in the WHA. In the meantime, the amendment to the IHR based upon the principle of "universal application" was passed, and the Canadian endorsement for Taiwan's participation was restated. Similar support by the Canadian parliament was won in 2006 with a letter endorsed by 151 parliamentarians and addressed to Lee Jong Wook, the secretary general of the WHO. In May 2007, Tony Clement, the Canadian health minister, publicly expressed his government's endorsement for Taiwan's participation. In the meantime, Chen Shui-bian's administration also repeatedly dispatched ambassadors at large to Canada to get government and popular support for Taiwan's bid.

During its eight years in power, the DPP government was assertive in efforts to institutionalize Canada-Taiwan relations along the lines of the American model, where substantive bilateral relations are governed by a domestically codified framework of the Taiwan Relations Act.<sup>30</sup> The introduction of Bill C-357, the Taiwan Affairs Act (TAA), by Jim Abbott in the House of Commons on April 4, 2005, provided opportunities for Taipei to influence Ottawa's agenda setting in this direction. Although the TAA was drafted cautiously so as not to transgress the PRC's "one China" red line by aiming to "provide an improved framework for economic, trade, cultural and other initiatives between the people of Canada and the people of Taiwan," it incited heated debates in the House of Commons that lasted for more than six months, creating serious concerns in both the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the PRC's embassy.<sup>31</sup> The bill became dormant in the fall of 2005, because of the dissolution of Parliament for the federal election, but the deliberation process helped raise much concern over the Taiwan issue in Canada. As an anonymous MOFA official put it, this episode also symbolized a transformation of Taipei's strategies from seeking merely non-binding resolutions in Parliament on matters such as Taiwan's WHA participation toward aiming for binding legislation.<sup>32</sup> Although several MPs and the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group (CTPFG) evidently played a direct role in the TAA deliberations, the policy process of its issue framing and agenda setting was more or less shaped by TECO Canada.

The CTPFG was formally created in December 1992. As the largest subgroup in Parliament, with more than 100 members among MPs and senators, it aimed to promote substantive ties with Taiwan. Like numerous parliamentary groupings in other countries that had a clear disposition toward Taiwan, the CTPFG constituted one of the core Taiwan lobbies that exerted influence on Taiwan-related policy-making by the Canadian federal government. On average, three delegations of parliamentarians were assembled to visit Taiwan each year. Some politicians were also solicited to attend particular symbolic events, often organized along the themes of security, democracy, and human rights. For example, three parliamentarians led by Senator David Smith were invited for a one-week visit to attend the first annual meeting of the International Parliamentary Forum for Asia-

---

<sup>29</sup> In fact, before 2003, some Canadian MPs, notably John McKay, wrote to Canada's prime minister and foreign minister asking for support for Taiwan's participation; "Ottawa Asked to Support."

<sup>30</sup> It should be noted that while the "Canadian formula" of 1970 broke the ground for the international community to normalize relations with Beijing, the Japanese and American practices went even further to pursue the simultaneous establishment of permanent institutional representations and legalization of non-official relations with Taiwan, in 1972 and 1979 respectively. See Wu, "Institutional Development and Adaptability"; Wu, "Canada and the Global Diffusion"; Wu, *International Constitution*.

<sup>31</sup> House of Commons, *Debates*, 38<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Vol. 140, no. 099, May 16, 2005. Evidence before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 3, 2005, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1812316&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=38&Ses=1>; November 1, 2005, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2077985&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=38&Ses=1>.

<sup>32</sup> The juxtaposition of "non-binding" and "binding" was drawn from Myles Hulme's interview with a MOFA official in Taipei, on July 28, 2009.

Pacific Security in January 2004. Similarly, Senator Mac Harb visited Taiwan and attended the ceremonial establishment of the DPU in August 2005. Two years later, he and MP Nina Grewal came back to participate in the DPU annual meeting. The Canadian visits to Taiwan were reciprocated with trips from sister Taiwanese organizations, and groups parallel to the CTPFG were formed in Taipei. For instance, on August 21, 2005, a Taiwan-Canada Parliament Social Group delegation led by Legislator Cheng Kuo-chong visited Ottawa to meet their counterparts, including MPs Don Boudria and David Kilgour.<sup>33</sup>

Dr. Thomas Chen served at TECO Canada for most of the eight-year DPP administration until his successor, Dr. David Tawei Lee, took office in April 2007. In his tenure, Thomas Chen significantly raised Taiwan's visibility in Canada. Taiwanese parliamentary, human rights, and democracy diplomacy toward Canada was conducted, with his staff's logistical support. In addition, the WHO/WHA and UN bids and the TAA were among the core issues in his years. Additionally, he made mutual visits by high-level officials one of his top priorities.<sup>34</sup> As such, the majority of Taiwanese cabinet-level officials, with the exception of the foreign minister, the defence minister, the vice-premier, and the premier, visited Canada during Chen's tenure. Perhaps most noteworthy was the visit in February 2007 by Dr. Joseph Wu, in his capacity as the chair of the Mainland Affairs Council, before he took the position of representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, DC.

Capitalizing on a global trend of soft power diplomacy, Chen launched a quarterly Web-based edition of *TECO News* as a major forum to enhance local understanding of Taiwan's accomplishments on democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights as well as of the state of bilateral exchanges. Despite its seemingly non-political function, the publication highlighted any event with a connotation of de facto recognition for Taiwan's sovereignty. For example, *TECO News* devoted a whole page to celebrating a Quebec Superior Court decision affirming that Taiwan exists as a state and benefits from jurisdictional immunity under the State Immunity Act.<sup>35</sup> Various social events were held in Chen's official residence during his tenure, and all were explicitly reported in *TECO News*. These events included the launch of the Capital Style Magazine Angel Foundation, the reception of Miss Canada 2003, local charity events, a breast cancer fundraiser, and a fashion show fundraiser.<sup>36</sup> Although these soft events might not have directly aimed to shape Canadian policy, they nevertheless helped project a new brand of Taiwanese representation.

It should be added that, at the time, neither TECO Canada nor its representative, Thomas Chen, monopolized all major bilateral-oriented social functions or activities. TECO Toronto and its directors general, for example, were also quite active in promoting exchanges through frequent meetings and visits with Canadian elites from various policy sectors, which were recorded in the *Diplomatic Almanac*, at least from 2003 to 2007.

Other Taiwanese public diplomacy measures included inviting the chief-level editors or columnists of major Canadian media to visit Taiwan. For example, in November 2003, Chris Nelson, editor-in-chief of the *Calgary Sun*, made a trip to Taiwan. Shortly after, a well-known international columnist from the *Vancouver Sun*, Jonathan Manthorpe, was invited for a longer visit in February 2004. One year later, Kirk LaPointe, the managing editor of the *Vancouver Sun*, went to the island for a visit.

While much of the parliamentary diplomacy and local engagement activities as well as other measures to implement the goal of enhancing substantive relations with Canada continued after May 2008, the Ma Ying-jeou administration departed significantly from its predecessors in its formulation of fundamental objectives and approaches. As officially stated, the Ma government has sought to promote "flexible (or viable) diplomacy" and to uphold the principles of "dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and agility."<sup>37</sup> It has also delivered to both

<sup>33</sup> In January 2009, the group was chaired by Legislator Kuo-dong Liao; <http://webhost1.ly.gov.tw/10964/bo-blog/read.php?31>.

<sup>34</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOFA official in Taipei, April 21, 2009.

<sup>35</sup> "Canadian Court Recognizes." The case was *François Parent v. Singapore Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Administration* (2003).

<sup>36</sup> "TECO Hosts Angel Foundation Launch"; "TECO Hosts Miss Canada"; "TECO Hosts Local Charity Events"; "TECO Hosts Breast Cancer Fundraiser"; "TECO Hosts Fall Fashion Show."

<sup>37</sup> Ou, "Foreign Policy Report."

domestic and external audiences the message that it wants a diplomatic truce with Beijing. In a senior MOFA official's view, "For too long, we have suffered the infamous label of using chequebook diplomacy and being troublemakers in the Pacific ... The previous government lost rather than gained diplomatic partners ... while losing the friendship of almost all the major countries."<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the Ma government tried to shift Taiwan's image away from that of "troublemaking" and toward "peacemaking." In the meantime, at least at the time of writing, aboriginal affairs and human rights, and to a lesser extent democracy, have lost their position as primary policy objectives. Instead, Canadian approval of visa waivers for Taiwanese visitors and mutual cooperation in such functional areas as science and technology have been promoted to primary concerns for the administration. This juxtaposition may become clearer in the broader context of functional issue areas.

## ASSERTING AGENCY IN VARIOUS ISSUE DOMAINS

To achieve Taiwan's overarching foreign policy objectives, the main task of its policy toward Canada, as toward other Western countries, is to promote both substantive relationships and Taiwan's brand. Indeed, the communications aspect of public diplomacy has increasingly become a vital part of Taipei's interactions with Ottawa, as partly shown in *TECO News*. Toward that end, there are a variety of means by which Taiwan has sought to cultivate and strengthen bilateral linkages. As noted above, these include the promotion of reciprocal visits by cabinet-level executives or legislature members and the solicitation of support via agents such as the CTPFG. Taiwan's policy has also focused on convening bilateral consultations between officers from government agencies and NGOs from both countries, typically in such areas as higher education, the initiation of the Taiwan Scholarship Program, the twinning of cities, and the conclusion of MOUs or the exchange of letters on various functional issues. This section outlines several institutionalized bilateral exchanges in city-to-city relationships, aboriginal affairs, education, and science and technology.

At the local level, twinning of cities and city-to-city mutual visits are often components of contemporary Canada-Taiwan exchanges. For example, at the invitation of TECO Vancouver, Alberta's capital city, Edmonton, signed "Trade Cities" agreements with the three largest metropolitan cities in the island, namely Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung in January 2004.<sup>39</sup> Oxford, Ontario, the hometown of missionary George Leslie Mackay, who is revered in Taiwan, entered into a twin cities agreement with Tamsui (Danshui) in Taipei County and dispatched a 22-member group to visit Taiwan and celebrated the historical legacy of Mackay in March 2002. Five years later, a large delegation of Canadian mayors and officials made a special visit to Taiwan.

It should be emphasized that while many bilateral exchanges are supposed to fall within non-political or functional spheres that are by default society-to-society in their presentation, central government agencies in Taiwan, due to its unitary state system as opposed to the Canadian federal framework, continue to be key players in bridging the two nations. The bilateral cooperation on aboriginal affairs appears to be unique: here, exchanges and their arrangements launched by the state have successfully spilled over to people-to-people initiatives that have moved aside or bypassed the state agencies. This model contains more spontaneous elements that could persist for a longer time even without guidance from state agencies. The institutionalization of aboriginal cooperation between the two countries, which signifies in some ways the bridging of a "forbidden nation" with First Nations,<sup>40</sup> continues even with the decline of state power. This needs some elaboration.

From their beginnings in the late 1990s, Canada-Taiwan aboriginal exchanges started with various state initiatives, particularly on the Taiwan side and later reciprocated by the Canadian side, without much advocacy

---

<sup>38</sup> Callick, "China and Taiwan."

<sup>39</sup> "Edmonton Mayor Signs Agreements."

<sup>40</sup> Manthorpe, *Forbidden Nation*.

or pressure from either country's societal groups.<sup>41</sup> This was most evident in the conclusion of the first MOU on aboriginal affairs cooperation in December 1998. These initiatives would probably not have been launched without the timely formation of an independent Taiwanese government agency, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs (CAA), on December 1, 1996. As of March 13, 2010, the CAA's official mandate states that it "plans and promotes indigenous policies and affairs based on guidelines laid out in constitutional amendments, the Indigenous Policy White Paper and a new partnership agreement between Taiwan's government and indigenous people signed by President Chen Shui-bian." It also aims "to respond to the needs of the indigenous peoples, as well as to bring Taiwan in line with global trends."<sup>42</sup>

From 1997 to 1999, Hwa Chia-chih, minister for the CAA at the time, led delegations to visit Canada every year, he reached the MOU in late 1998. It broke significantly new ground for both parties. Since then, exchanges have been increasingly under way. For example, in May and June 2002, a 20-member First Nations delegation led by former MP Elijah Harper visited the CIP and MOFA and participated in cultural exchanges in Pingtung, Taitung, and Hualien Counties, where many Taiwanese aboriginal people reside.<sup>43</sup> In the meantime, interpersonal linkages among a few individuals such as Harper and Kon Wen-ji, a well-known aboriginal lawmaker in Taiwan, grew across the Pacific. Gradually, more initiatives were taken by these individual advocates at the societal level.

There were cases of contacts and exchanges that even bypassed the state agencies from their beginnings. For instance, the Agreement of Exchange between the Institute of Aboriginal Health at Tzu Chi University, Hualien, Taiwan, and the First Nations University of Canada (FNUC), Saskatchewan, was reached on June 20, 2006, as an individual initiative.<sup>44</sup> A twinning agreement between National Donghua University at Hualien and the FNUC was realized in a similar way in Saskatoon one year later. On the other hand, Taiwan-Canada aboriginal ties in a sort of state-society linkage across the Pacific continue to grow and be institutionalized at the same time. The most evident institutionalized exchanges in this regard are the CIP-led delegations to the annual meetings of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) from 1999 to 2007. So far, virtually all ministers responsible for the CIP have routinely led Taiwanese delegations to attend such events. (Exceptions were Minister Wallis Pelin of the DPP government, who cancelled his trip for family reasons and instead sent his deputy minister, Pu Chung-cheng; and Chang Jen-Hsiang in the Ma government.<sup>45</sup>) These practices have made cooperation on aboriginal affairs across the Pacific even more distinctive than exchanges on other policy issue areas.

Moreover, the CIP-AFN exchanges helped break new ground for government-to-government contacts between the two parties. In some cases, the CIP officials attending the AFN meetings were able to make en route visits to the Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) headquarters in Ottawa to meet their counterparts, accompanied by MOFA officers serving in TECO Canada. The CIP also sponsored and sent several aboriginal youths to Canada for international affairs training, which helped cultivate prospective indigenous leaders who would build ties and have good international knowledge. In July 2008, for instance, three indigenous Taiwanese students were chosen by the CIP to take up internships at the Métis National Council.<sup>46</sup>

There are some distinctions between the institutional format undertaken in economics, education, or science and technology on the one hand and aboriginal affairs on the other. Unlike economics, education, and the cultural and scientific realms, where government agencies on both sides can theoretically contact one another directly in both capitals, aboriginal affairs has no independent division at TECO Canada specifically responsible for contacting INAC on behalf of the CIP. Thus, much of the government-level communication occurs between

---

<sup>41</sup> My interview with an anonymous senior CIP official, Taipei, August 14, 2009; my interview with Sylvia Yan, Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, August 17, 2009.

<sup>42</sup> Council of Indigenous Peoples, "About CIP."

<sup>43</sup> Council of Indigenous Peoples and Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, "Celebrating 10 Years."

<sup>44</sup> My interview with Sylvia Yan, Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, August 17, 2009.

<sup>45</sup> Chang stepped down in a cabinet shuffle in September 2009.

<sup>46</sup> Chang, "Foreword"; Hagao, Kwesi, and Akimn, "Internships Report."

the CIP and CTOT in Taipei. The 1998 and 2008 MOUs were signed and renewed in such a way. But it should be noted that even when there is a special division in TECO Canada in charge of such issue areas as economics, education, or science and technology, no MOU has been formally signed between comparable government agencies located in Canada and Taiwan using their official titles. Even if negotiations were conducted between officials from respective agencies on an individual rather than institutional level, the eventual deals on an institution-to-institution basis were struck either between the CTOT and TECO, or between a Canadian government agency and TECO. Nevertheless, Canada-Taiwan cooperation on aboriginal affairs is unique in the sense that significant amounts of negotiations and exchanges were done in Taipei, where the CIP and CTOT represented the various parties, directly or indirectly.

Educational and cultural relations are among the major resources that any country can deploy to display its soft power. In particular, artistic or cultural exhibitions, scholarly exchanges, and promotion of studies of the host countries are among legitimate pivotal programs for public diplomacy.<sup>47</sup> Taiwan is not exceptional in pursuing such campaigns toward Canada. Indeed, various programs have been set up in this issue area and have served as important instruments of influence. They also give both Canada and Taiwan a level of "soft political access to each other that both parties would not have otherwise due to lack of official diplomatic relations."<sup>48</sup> The exchanges in this domain were facilitated primarily after the formation of TECO Canada's cultural division in 1992.<sup>49</sup> Since then, the Ministry of Education's Bureau of International Cultural and Educational Relations (BICER), for which the cultural division is accountable, has negotiated several MOUs with CTOT on education-related cooperation. It also regularly undertakes working group meetings with CTOT. In these small-scale meetings, both sides plan various programs, events, or activities and discuss how to coordinate and implement them in the coming year.<sup>50</sup>

There are other bilateral institutionalized meetings. Among them, the best known is the Canada-Taiwan Conference on Higher Education, which has been hosted in alternation by universities in Canada and Taiwan since its inception at the University of Calgary in 1991. Over more than a decade, these consultations have seen participation by greater numbers of higher education institutions from both sides. For example, at the eighth conference, in May 2005, 17 universities reached agreements on academic cooperation. Among them, the University of Toronto concluded a Letter of Intent for Canada-Taiwan Academic Cooperation. One year later, the number of participant institutions increased to 29 Canadian universities and 21 Taiwanese counterparts when the conference was hosted at National Taiwan University. The most recent meeting was convened at Carleton University in April 2009. The Canada-Taiwan Conference on Higher Education also turned out to serve as an invaluable exemplar for Taiwan's bilateral consultations on higher education with other countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia.

Taiwan's exchanges with Canada in other education-related domains also became models for its bilateral engagements with other countries. In the area of recruiting English teachers, for example, Canada was the forerunner to Taiwan's bilateral engagements with other Western countries. When the arrangement began, in 2005, five Canadian English teachers were recruited for service in Taiwan, in accordance with an MOU concluded in May 2004. Since then, Canadian English teachers have significantly outnumbered those recruited from other English-speaking countries such as the United States.<sup>51</sup> In 2005, Canadian English teachers teaching in Taiwanese primary or secondary schools increased to 35, and the number grew to 84 by the end of 2006. As the scale of exchanges escalated, the initial MOU was further revised and concluded in June 2007.

---

<sup>47</sup> Potter, *Branding Canada*.

<sup>48</sup> Potter, *Branding Canada*, 136.

<sup>49</sup> Before the MOE established its cultural division within TECO Canada, it already had overseas offices in the United States, Japan, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1992, 315.

<sup>50</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, July 14, 2009.

<sup>51</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, July 14, 2009.

The MOE has also primarily been in charge of the Taiwan Scholarship Program, coordinating collective contributions from other departments including MOFA, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the National Science Council since 2004. It supported international students to attend Mandarin-based undergraduate as well as graduate degree programs at Taiwanese universities for a maximum of five years.<sup>52</sup> The MOE also set up the Hanyu Enrichment Scholarship Program to attract overseas students to learn Mandarin at any of the Chinese language centres in Taiwan for a period of three months to one year. Up until the end of 2007, 56 Canadian scholars or students had received the scholarships and gone to study in Taiwan. Moreover, as another part of soft power diplomacy, the cultural divisions of TECO branches publicized the DPU's provision of graduate and visiting fellowships for scholars, NGO leaders, politicians, and media representatives of the DPU member states for the study of subjects related to various aspects of Taiwan's development.

A Taiwan Studies Grant for Canadian Scholars was created to sponsor Canadians to pursue field research on Taiwan-related subjects. At its genesis in the early 1990s, a general category of scholarships was established by the MOE to attract Western scholars doing research on Taiwan. Canada was not originally among the targeted clients for the general scholarship, but it was added as a "special" category as of 1993.<sup>53</sup> In the late 1990s, CTOT also launched the George Mackay Scholarship, which offered Taiwanese scholars opportunities for field research on Canada-related studies. In this way, the embryo of reciprocal arrangements between the two sides came into being, although it did not result from planned coordination between the MOE and CTOT. The scholarship nevertheless set a model for Taiwan's bilateral academic exchanges with other countries. In fact, the offer of Taiwan Studies scholarships was later expanded to cover those studies by other national scholars from the West, even though they did not necessarily exist in the form of reciprocal arrangements.<sup>54</sup> More importantly, the special scholarship subsequently evolved into the Taiwan Studies Scholarship, which coincidentally matches the Canada-initiated Canadian Studies Scholarship (now renamed the Understanding Canada Scholarship) in a reciprocal way.

Notwithstanding the expansion of bilateral exchanges in education, there are some limitations on enhancing the level and extent of mutual engagement. One particular barrier is related to institutional disparity. While the Taiwanese constitution and government are organized for a unitary-state system, where education constitutes one of the key central government agencies, in Canada there is no comparable department at the federal government level. Therefore, the cultural division of TECO Canada can deal only with responsible provincial or local government agencies or directly with universities or societal organizations such as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. In Taiwan, this bilateral coordination must be conducted between BICER and CTOT or the Canadian Education Centre. So coordination problems are significant in preparing for consultations on higher education. From the MOE perspective, it is a challenge for the Canadian side simply to decide which university will host the next conference when it is to be held in Canada.<sup>55</sup>

These path-breaking achievements in Canada-Taiwan cooperation on education should not be taken to indicate consistently high performance across all areas in this domain. In some fields, such as the export of Mandarin teachers from Taiwan to Canada, initiatives were not as fruitful as expected. Although this program began as early as the mid-1990s,<sup>56</sup> it did not grow substantially, and the plan to promote Canada as a destination for teachers appears to be suspended, in contrast to similar policy actions targeted at other major Western countries.<sup>57</sup>

In the domain of science and technology, Canada and Taiwan have maintained close exchanges since at

<sup>52</sup> The ministry later imposed a maximum of two years for Mandarin training.

<sup>53</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1993, 321, 326.

<sup>54</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, July 14, 2009.

<sup>55</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, July 14, 2009.

<sup>56</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1995, 371.

<sup>57</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, July 14, 2009.

least the mid-1990s. On the Canadian side, the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) is no doubt one of the major players. Since 1997, the NRC has developed very strong relationships and facilitated collaborative R&D projects with Taiwanese institutions, most notably through its agreements with the Industrial Technology Research Institute and the National Science Council (NSC). These international partnerships have grown, and as of 2005 they included over 40 joint research projects, several technical workshops, training for PhDs and post-doctoral fellows, and exchanges of eminent researchers. The president of the NRC, Dr. Pierre Coulombe, chose Taiwan as a destination for his first visit to Asia, in September 2005. As the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service reported, "The National Research Council's cooperation with Taiwan's National Science Council represents one of its largest bilateral research and development relationship [sic] outside of North America."<sup>58</sup>

The record of bilateral sci-tech collaborative activities where the Science and Technology Division of TECO Canada has been instrumental is substantial.<sup>59</sup> Among them, collaborations with the NRC are indeed top of the list; a number of MOUs have been signed with it since 1997. The NSC and the NRC have collaborated in the fields of natural sciences and engineering through these programs:

- Canada-Taiwan Sci-Tech Personnel Visiting Program. Since 1998 more than 600 sci-tech professionals from Taiwan have visited Canada, and more than 200 Canadians have been to Taiwan.
- Eminent Researchers Program. Each side recommends five outstanding scholars and researchers from this program to visit each other every year.
- Post-doctoral researchers and PhD students exchange program.
- Astrophysics and engineering collaborative study program. The NRC has offered six positions to young Taiwanese scientific researchers to study at its Herzberg Institute of Astrophysics. The program includes studying astrophysics and various techniques for the proper use and maintenance of instruments and equipment.
- Bilateral symposia and workshops in fields including natural hazards mitigation, civil engineering and structure, neuroscience, internet technology, aerospace, agricultural biotechnology, semiconductor technology, and marine biosciences.
- Collaborative research projects. The NSC and the NRC have performed more than 34 joint research projects since 1998 on such themes as natural sciences and engineering and bio-tech-related subjects.
- Large-scale nanotechnology collaborative research projects.

Second, the NSC has collaborated with the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), the major source of funding in Canada for university-based research in natural sciences, engineering, and life sciences. Under an MOU signed by NSERC and the NSC in September 1998, the two agencies cooperate by exchange of information, exchange of researchers between Taiwan and Canada, bilateral research collaborations in the fields of natural sciences and engineering research, and other means. The collaborative Summer Program in Taiwan, ongoing since 2004, allows five to ten Canadian graduate students the opportunity to study or conduct internships in Taiwan for eight weeks in summer.

Third, the NSC has worked with the Communications Research Centre (CRC), an agency of Industry Canada and the primary federal laboratory for research and development in advanced telecommunications. The NSC-CRC MOU on Telecommunication Technology was signed in May 2001. A three-year collaborative project from 2006 to 2009 was involved with joint research and development on the design and fabrication of biomedical chips and environmental detective chips. Four NSC scientists were sent to CRC each year to participate in this project.

---

<sup>58</sup> "Economic Profile – Taiwan."

<sup>59</sup> Descriptions of the NSC's collaborative activities in the following paragraphs are drawn from "Bilateral Science and Technology Cooperation."

Fourth, the NSC has collaborated with other federal institutions, including the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). The NSC and SSHRC signed an MOU on Social Sciences and Humanities Cooperation in March 1999, involving the exchange of personnel and bilateral workshops. The NSC also maintained active and close relationships with the CIHR, sending strategic planners in the development of biotechnology policies from Taiwan to the CIHR over the past few years. A joint workshop on hepatocellular carcinoma was held in Taipei in December 2007. Finally, the NSC has also engaged with Canadian universities.

Insofar as major bilateral agreements are concerned, Industry Canada and TECO Canada first reached an MOU for Cooperation in the Fields of Communications and Information Technologies (CIT) on June 1, 1998. As spam increasingly posed threats to economic security, both sides went further in accordance with the 1998 MOU on CIT and reached a separate MOU on Cooperation in the Field of Anti-Spam Policies and Strategies (ASPS) in November 2006.<sup>60</sup> This came after the formal establishment of the National Communications Commission (NCC) in Taiwan in February 2006. And a new MOU for cooperation on CIT was concluded to replace the 1998 document in July 2007.<sup>61</sup>

After the Ma Ying-jeou government took office, bilateral cooperation in science and technology continued and was undertaken on an even more intensive and frequent basis. This was indicated by the first and second meetings pursuant to the anti-spam MOU, which were held in Taiwan and Canada in 2008 and 2009. In fact, Canada was the first country with which Taiwan signed an MOU on ASPS. Subsequently, Taiwan reached similar MOUs with Australia and Brazil.<sup>62</sup> As with the achievements in the realms of aboriginal affairs and education, from Taiwan's perspective, the Canada-Taiwan MOU on ASPS provided a prime model for Taipei's pursuit of bilateral cooperation with other countries.

To sum up, Canada and Taiwan have reached MOUs in various functional domains such as aboriginal affairs, education, science and technology, anti-spam policies, and CIT. In fact, the list of MOUs is not limited to the above five categories. It also includes agreements on agriculture, air services, maritime technology, investment, and financial supervision. From the Canadian perspective, the traditional priority sectors include agri-food and seafood, life sciences, building products, transportation, and CIT, as well as science and technology partnerships and two-way investment. New opportunities for mutual cooperation are suggested for such areas as the environment and alternative energies.<sup>63</sup>

## CANADA AND TAIWAN: EXCHANGES ACROSS THE PACIFIC

There is abundant evidence not only that Taiwan tried to sway Canada's policy toward China/Taiwan in its own favour, but also that Canadian policy in turn shaped Taiwan's policy elsewhere. Taiwan in many ways tried to influence Canada's China policy by promoting the island state as a worthy, peace-loving, and economically advanced partner. For the Lee Teng-hui government, democratization and economic prosperity were major assets in promoting Taiwan's brand abroad. For the Chen Shui-bian government, the practices of democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights were intended to highlight Taiwan's place within the progressive liberal West. For the Ma Ying-jeou government, these issues and their political implications have now become assumed and unspoken values, while regular scientific, economic, and cultural exchanges continue to expand in a much more prominent way.

---

<sup>60</sup> Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Canada, and Industry Canada, "Anti-Spam Policies and Strategies."

<sup>61</sup> Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Canada, and Industry Canada, "Communications and Information Technologies."

<sup>62</sup> Huang, "Status of Anti-Spam Measures."

<sup>63</sup> "Economic Profile – Taiwan."

Over decades of interaction, Canadians at first learned that there are aboriginal peoples in Taiwan. More importantly, Taiwan's own policy measures were very much shaped by interaction with Canadians and were inspired by bilateral institutionalized practices. These include the recruitment of Canadian English teachers, regular consultation meetings on higher education, the reciprocal arrangement of the Canadian Studies Scholarship and the Taiwan Scholarship, the MOU on ASPS, the establishment of an aboriginal TV network in Taiwan, and the MOU on aboriginal affairs. How engagement with Canadian aboriginal people shaped Taiwanese domestic and international aspects of aboriginal policy deserves some attention.

The set-up of Taiwan Indigenous TV (TITV) in December 2004, a pioneering venture in Asia, was evidently modeled after the Winnipeg-based Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN), which was launched as the first national aboriginal television network in the world in September 1999. A senior Taiwanese CIP official acknowledged that the start-up of APTN pushed Taiwan to act and that TITV learned from watching the development of the Canadian venture.<sup>64</sup> Insofar as the international aspect of aboriginal policy is concerned, Taiwan's signing of an MOU with Canada on cooperation in aboriginal affairs was really groundbreaking. The successful experience was later reproduced by Taiwan's CIP when it reached similar agreements with New Zealand in May 2004, Belize in August 2006, and the Philippines in February 2007, although there was some time lag between the arrangements with Canada and with New Zealand because of the latter's sensitivity about Beijing's response.<sup>65</sup>

But it appears that Taipei's policy toward Canada in such broader domains as cooperation on democracy promotion,<sup>66</sup> education,<sup>67</sup> and science and technology has not really diverged from its policies in relation to exchanges with other industrialized countries. Canada was not deliberately chosen as the first partner to be engaged with. By contrast, the role of aboriginal affairs in Taiwan's policy toward Canada and the extent of its institutionalization, as it spread from the initial state level to spontaneous societal initiatives, are noticeably distinctive. In fact, Canadian aboriginal peoples became the first partners in Taiwan's international bilateral engagement, although the process of searching for the partnership included some unexpected events.<sup>68</sup> As it turned out, the successful exchange experience with the Canadians became an exemplar for Taiwan's aboriginal peoples as they reached out to other partners bilaterally. Even in multilateral organizations, notably the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Taiwan's Canadian connection, be it through CTOT officials or Canadian aboriginal delegations to the forum, has been effectively relied upon to help broaden or translate into more durable engagement with other international counterparts.<sup>69</sup>

The institutionalization of bilateral exchanges presumes the existence and development of organizations that can initiate and mobilize for that purpose. This can be demonstrated in the creation of various MOUs between Canada and Taiwan. Almost all of them were reached and implemented with organizational bases set in place to provide required logistics support and to monitor their implementation afterward. In education, for example, only after the cultural division within TECO was established in 1992 was an MOU signed and put into

---

<sup>64</sup> My interview with an anonymous CIP official, August 14, 1999. The APTN actually developed originally from Television Northern Canada (TVNC) in the early 1990s. For the evolution of the APTN, see <http://www.aptn.ca/corporate/milestones.php>. For the development of the TITV, see "The Origin of Taiwan Indigenous Television," <http://www.titv.org.tw>.

<sup>65</sup> The delay in negotiations was much related to Auckland's concern about Beijing's pressure. It finally broke the ice through a MOFA official who was in charge of Asia and Pacific affairs and later brought talks to a successful conclusion in his tenure as the representative to New Zealand. My interview with an anonymous CIP official, August 14, 2009.

<sup>66</sup> My interviews with Maysing Yang, vice-president, and Bo Tedards, director of the International Cooperation Department, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Taipei, August 27, 2009.

<sup>67</sup> My interview with an anonymous MOE official, Taipei, July 14, 2009.

<sup>68</sup> As an interview with an anonymous CIP official revealed, the United States was intended to be the prime target for Taiwan's aboriginal engagement. However, factors such as the nature of American Indian policy, the relatively lukewarm response the CIP received, and the degree of influence by the responsible agency in American decision-making tended to discourage the CIP from pursuing further such linkage. My interview, August 14, 2009.

<sup>69</sup> Liu, "Report on the Participation," 20-21.

practice that included a Canada-specific scholarship and various programs for visiting teachers and for exporting teachers of Mandarin.<sup>70</sup> Similarly, in science and technology, only after the scientific division of TECO Canada was set up in 1995 did MOUs on science and technology and their related exchanges follow to a significant degree. In aboriginal affairs, the MOU was signed only after the CAA was formed in late 1996. The NCC was another example: the MOUs on ASPs and CIT were reached or revised after its formation in 2006.

In a broader sense, these various approaches can be seen as the major ways Taipei sought to influence Canada's Taiwan policy. They nevertheless boil down to efforts to insert or promote some common values and interests that Taiwan believes should bring it Canadian concern and support as an equal partner or distinct entity, no matter whether the bilateral relations are parallel to or convergent with Ottawa's ties with Beijing. This raises an intriguing question, related to the sort of "conspiracy theory" embraced by some Canadian officials in the old days: Does Taipei's effort to strengthen bilateral ties aim to deliberately affect Canadian China policy in a way that in turn shapes Beijing's perception of its own interest, so that it would tacitly accept Taipei's de facto independence or international participation? This policy motive appeared evident during the years when bilateral relations were handled in the context of the ongoing Beijing-Taipei diplomatic logjam. The controversy over the 2004 "defensive referendum," the WHO/WHA and UN campaigns by the Chen Shui-bian government, and Beijing's hard-line posture toward these initiatives rendered it necessary for the Canadians to urge a peaceful resolution of differences, to support Taiwan's request for observer status at the WHA, and to make no public statements denying Taiwan's sovereignty in the UN forums. To some extent these developments therefore met Taipei's goals.

Since the Ma Ying-jeou administration took office on May 20, 2008, a cross-Strait détente together with a diplomatic truce may have reduced the need for Ottawa to take positions, which further obscures whether Taipei still has a hidden policy agenda to induce Canadian policy behaviour that serves Taipei's own interests. On the other hand, as long as Taipei engages in direct rapprochement with Beijing on its own initiative without consulting or even communicating with its long-standing Western allies in advance – as it demonstrated in successfully negotiating observer status for the 2009 WHA – the new approach might lead to a situation that unwittingly compromises Taiwan's chances in its prolonged effort to maintain a sort of equilibrium among Chinese and other international forces. This deserves some elaboration in light of Taiwan's policy priorities.

Insofar as Taiwan's mainland-vs.-international policy is concerned, in general, because of the "three nos" policy ("no contact, no negotiation, no compromise with Beijing") of former president Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan had a self-imposed "boomerang pattern" of foreign policy behaviour.<sup>71</sup> Taiwan influenced Beijing's preference and interest toward respecting the cross-Strait status quo by asserting its international space and activities and by seeking to weave a network of tacit support from primarily Western democracies. In other words, the status quo, which gives Taiwan a status of de facto independence, was maintained by an equilibrium between mainland and foreign policies that nevertheless tilted, as a default position, toward seeking support from international moral communities or democracies rather than from mainland China. The Chen Shui-bian government was overtly aggressive in making international policy dominant, but its approach unwittingly backfired in the end, alienating some of its traditional allies and agitating Beijing. Generally it continued to follow the fundamental principle underlying the boomerang pattern: choosing to side with the West or the rest of the world vis-à-vis the PRC, and seeking to change the latter's preference, interests, and behaviour through networking with the former.

---

<sup>70</sup> Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1993, 321, 326; Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Almanac*, 1995, 369, 371.

<sup>71</sup> The "boomerang pattern" analogy is drawn from Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's oft-cited work on transnational advocacy networks (*Activists beyond Borders*). Keck and Sikkink explore how given societal actors of a country who have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas may seek or activate international connections where these actors' allied NGOs abroad pressure their respective states or intergovernmental organizations, which in turn pressure the actors' own home government (12-13). Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between Keck and Sikkink's focus on voluntary NGOs and my case on Taiwan's foreign policy behaviour.

By contrast, the Ma government's approach reversed the orthodox boomerang pattern of balancing strategies by pursuing a direct rapprochement with the PRC on its own initiative without working through other nations, and hoping to affect Beijing's interests in a desirable direction. While this new approach has effectively made ad hoc peace with Beijing, it might create unintended consequences by diminishing the need for Taipei to look to the Canadians or other Western powers to help influence China's foreign policy interests and behaviour toward seeing the merit of not blocking Taipei's international participation or of living with the status quo across the Strait. While the former orthodox approach tried to procrastinate on direct talks regarding the sovereignty issue with Beijing as long as possible – if not indefinitely – it sought to shift part of the burden of the status quo gridlock (or the de facto independence of Taiwan) to Beijing as well as to Taipei's moral supporters abroad. In other words, in the case of "no talk" across the Strait, Taipei could easily blame Beijing for setting an unreasonable, non-constructive precondition of recognizing its "one China" principle. Whenever this took place, as in the Lee and Chen administrations, the burden of cross-Strait gridlock was mostly shifted to the mainland, and statements from the West urging Beijing not to set preconditions for cross-Strait talks tacitly legitimated and boosted the moral cause of Taipei. In the Ma government, the new approach primarily takes the responsibility of cross-Strait talks only on itself and Beijing. Many Western countries, including Canada, would be relieved of the previous burden of according Taiwan their moral appeal or tacit support.

Overall, the differing policy priorities among the three administrations are evident. During the Lee Teng-hui administration, there were debates in Taipei's policy circles over whether mainland policy should be treated as of primary importance in foreign policy or as secondary. The Chen Shui-bian government separated mainland and international policy, arguably promoting the ranking of international policy, with mainland policy in some ways becoming its subordinate. For the Ma Ying-jeou government, the priority was reversed to the extent that a diplomatic truce is connected to and believed to facilitate a cross-Strait rapprochement, which is perceived to open policy windows of deepening substantive ties with foreign countries. The vision of the Ma government's new approach was exemplified by Dr. David Tawei Lee in summer 2009. Taiwan's representative in Canada wrote: "The warming temperature across the Taiwan Strait offers a golden opportunity for countries to deepen ties with Taiwan on non-political issues – trade and investment, tourism, economic and cultural exchanges." From this perspective, aboriginal and human rights issues that are parts of legitimate concerns in foreign policy of course receded in importance.

Nevertheless, the Ma government also pushed forcefully for issues with clear political implications. The visa waiver program is projected as one of the core areas where Canada-Taiwan relations can be improved with a "win-win" outcome. Lee cited the British decision to grant visa exemption to Taiwan in March 2009 to demonstrate that Ma's rapprochement with Beijing has borne fruit for Taipei's international space and created a "win-win" situation for Taiwan-UK-PRC relations. He claimed that after the British decision, relations between Beijing and London continued to flourish and "the overall occupancy rate of direct flights between London and Taipei increased from less than 50 percent to more than 90 percent, and boosted total receipts and job opportunities from increased tourism." He also explicitly expressed his hope that "in the near future Canada will join the growing list of countries that have given visitors from Taiwan visa-exempt status so these traveling people can flock to the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics and take in the magnificent beauty of the Rocky Mountains."<sup>72</sup>

Although the Ma government's new approach might decrease the need for the Canadians to help influence Beijing's policy preference in Taipei's favour, this does not mean that it never sought to influence Canadian policy toward China. David Lee made Taipei's direction in affecting Canada's China policy even more evident in his testimony to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on May 27, 2009. He first mentioned Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon's favourable comments on cross-Strait rapprochement and Taiwan's participation in the WHA on April 30, and Canadian Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq's meeting with

---

<sup>72</sup> Lee, "The Chill Is Off."

Taiwanese Health Minister Yeh Chin-chuan in Geneva in mid-May. He attributed the two events to three key factors: "Ma's courageous decision to pursue détente with China," "China's goodwill response," and Canada's encouraging action afterward. Highlighting that Ma's mainland policy was consistent with Canadian interests and policy in the Asia-Pacific region and that both Taiwan and Canada possess robust service sectors, have compatible free-market economies, and are ranked top in overall competitiveness and innovation in the world, Lee urged Canada to seize the opportunity to make Taiwan a "gateway" and form a partnership to pursue business ventures in the Greater China and Southeast Asia markets. To make his policy argumentation more convincing, he cited three examples: Taiwan's Quanta Computer, TSMC, and Ulead Systems have complemented Canada-based Intrinsyc, Emerging Memory Technologies, and Corel respectively in existing or prospective mainland China marketing. In his conclusion, he again urged his Canadian audience to realize that "the shortest way to China is via Taiwan ... With the détente across the Strait, this is the golden opportunity for Canada, Taiwan and China to work together to create a 'win-win-win' model for mutual prosperity in the Greater China and Southeast Asia markets."<sup>73</sup>

It should be stressed that Lee's nuanced statements in May 2009 explicitly aimed to influence Canada's China policy by highlighting the compatibility of Ottawa and Taipei and the feasibility of a trilateral partnership with China during China's rise and globalization, primarily from economic and technological perspectives. In the presentation, the themes of democracy, human rights, and multiculturalism that once dominated Taipei's foreign policy discourse in previous years became faded. The priority and mandate of promoting democracy in the world, one of the major objectives of the TFD, appeared to be subject to review and readjustment. This change of tone is evident in President Ma's remarks at the fifth-anniversary celebration of the TFD on June 17, 2008: "We [or Taiwan] ... must be modest. We must not assume that, because everyone says we are the beacon of democracy to Asia and the world, we should direct and guide other nations [on how to practice democracy] ... I believe that it is not necessary for us to export democracy in the same way some Communist countries exported revolution. Instead, we can certainly share with developing countries how we have overcome the obstacles to democracy."<sup>74</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This paper has examined whether Taiwan continues to seek to affect Canada's China policy, and if so, in what ways it has pursued this goal. Its argument is that Taiwan has indeed tried to affect the course of Sino-Canadian relations, but it has been mainly in the legitimate context of an effort to gain some kind of recognition as an autonomous entity apart from and not subject to the PRC's sovereignty. At the same time, Taiwan's efforts to gain attention from both the Canadian government and the Canadian public have led Taiwan to stress common values and commitments in ways that have in turn affected Taiwan's evolution as a democratic polity domestically, while its promotion of substantive relations with Canada on several issue domains has also varyingly shaped the course of its engagement with other countries. The latter part of this mutual influence and its achievements were demonstrated in some aspects of higher education and science and technology policies as well as in much of the two countries' aboriginal affairs cooperation. Nevertheless, so far there has not been much evidence to support the proposition that Taiwan targeted Canada specifically as a foreign affairs touchstone right from the beginning, except in aboriginal affairs.

It may be fair to conclude that so long as Taiwan remains a de facto self-governing territory, with extensive international links on functional issue areas as well as intimate ties with Canada on those terrains, Taiwan will endeavour to deal with Canada as an independent entity and to solicit legitimate Canadian support for its status. This factor is in some ways independent of ongoing domestic and cross-Strait controversies concerning the nature of Taiwan's identity and its relationship to China. This could explain the continuity of Taiwan's policy

---

<sup>73</sup> Lee, "Presentation."

<sup>74</sup> Text and translation from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

toward Canada across the three recent administrations. Nevertheless, the degree to which Taiwan's diplomatic activities are viewed as provocative largely depends on the perception of Beijing and the vagaries of Taiwan's domestic political alignments. Therefore, Taiwan's conduct of foreign policy toward Canada cannot be separated completely from domestic politics or from cross-Strait relations. In the course of policy development, priorities in the mainland-international nexus and the emphasis on the guiding themes of economic prosperity, democracy, and human rights evidently varied from administration to administration.

The Chen Shui-bian government took a more aggressive approach in seeking to enhance Taiwan's relations with Canada, but its achievements were mixed. It made the Taiwan issue much more visible in Canada and considerably enhanced bilateral ties at least in terms of aboriginal affairs, human rights, and democracy. Nevertheless, the wall of constraints remained daunting. Despite considerable sympathy within the Conservative caucus for Taiwan, the Harper government eventually felt compelled to denounce Chen's "defensive referendum" initiative, and has not sought to revive the Taiwan Affairs Act while in office. David Lee's "win-win" language about the Beijing-Ottawa-Taipei triangle and his focus on economic and technological collaboration appear to be consistent with Ottawa's comfort level, and may yield greater practical effects in terms of institutionalized functional diplomacy. Nevertheless, given the decreasing popularity and increasing governance problems of the Ma government on the domestic front at this time, the possibility that a more aggressive stance traced to the legacy of the Chen Shui-bian government will re-emerge cannot be completely ruled out. As a consequence, whether the Ma government's new approach in search of rebalancing mainland-international policy will eventually prevail over his predecessors' "boomerang pattern" of balancing remains to be seen.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beecroft, Stephen. "Canadian Policy Towards China, 1949-57: The Recognition Problem." *In Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, 1949-70*, edited by Paul Evans and B. Michael Frolic, 43-72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- "Bilateral Science and Technology Cooperation." Science and Technology Division, Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Canada. <http://canada.nsc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7867&CtNode=381>.
- Callick, Rowan. "China and Taiwan End War over Pacific Aid." *Australian*, August 10, 2009. <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25905433-169>.
- "Canadian Court Recognizes Taiwan's Sovereignty." *TECO News 7*, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 8. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_71.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_71.pdf).
- Chang, Jen-Hsiang. "Foreword." In Council of Indigenous Peoples and the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, "Celebrating 10 Years of Canada-Taiwan Aboriginal Cooperation" [brochure in Chinese and English]. Taipei: CIP/CTOT, 2008.
- Clark, Campbell. "Cannon Lays Groundwork for Harper's China Visit." *Globe and Mail*, May 17, 2009. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090517.wChina18/BNStory/International/home>.
- Council of Indigenous Peoples. "About CIP." [http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail\\_official.jsp?cateID=A000177&linkSelf=131&linkRoot=99](http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail_official.jsp?cateID=A000177&linkSelf=131&linkRoot=99).
- Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP) and Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT). "Celebrating 10 Years of Canada-Taiwan Aboriginal Cooperation" [brochure in Chinese and English]. Taipei: CIP/CTOT, 2008.
- "Economic Profile—Taiwan." July 2009. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. <http://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/eng/document.jsp?did=61822&cod=519&oid=891>.
- "Edmonton Mayor Signs Agreements with Mayors in Taiwan." *TECO News 7*, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 4. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_71.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_71.pdf).
- Fang-Hsu, Faye, ed. *Essays and Memoirs Dedicated to Ambassador Chin-yen Fang* [in Chinese]. Taipei: privately printed, 2009.
- Gordon, Alastair. "CCD Speech at Rally for Taiwan." March 11, 2005, Toronto. Canadian Coalition for Democracy. <http://canadiancoalition.com/TaiwanRallySpeech20050311.shtml>.
- Hagao, Yawai, Botu Kwesi, and Akimn. "Aboriginal International Affairs Internships Report for a Trip to Métis National Council, Canada" [in Chinese]. July 8-August 4, 2008. [http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail\\_EVALUATE.jsp?isSearch=&docid=PA000000002031&cateID=A000455&linkSelf=0&linkRoot=0&linkParent=0&url=](http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail_EVALUATE.jsp?isSearch=&docid=PA000000002031&cateID=A000455&linkSelf=0&linkRoot=0&linkParent=0&url=)
- Hsia, Andrew. "Setting Exemplar through Diligent Dedication to the Country: In Memory of Ambassador Chin-yen Fang." In *Essays and Memoirs Dedicated to Ambassador Chin-yen Fang* [in Chinese], edited by Faye Fang-Hsu, 111-13. Taipei: privately printed, 2009.
- Huang, Vincent. "Status of Anti-Spam Measures." Presentation for the National Communications Commission, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canada-Taiwan Anti-Spam MOU meeting, Ottawa, May 13, 2009. [http://open.nat.gov.tw/OpenFront/report/show\\_file.jsp?sysId=C09801390&fileNo=002](http://open.nat.gov.tw/OpenFront/report/show_file.jsp?sysId=C09801390&fileNo=002).

- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Lee, David Tawei. "The Chill Is Off the Taiwan Strait." *Diplomat and International Canada*, Summer 2009, 13-14. [http://www.diplomatonline.com/pdf\\_files/SummerDiplomat2009.pdf](http://www.diplomatonline.com/pdf_files/SummerDiplomat2009.pdf).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Presentation to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade," May 27, 2009. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/en\\_news/2009\\_06\\_03\\_lee\\_en.htm](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/en_news/2009_06_03_lee_en.htm).
- Lee-Young, Joanne. "Canada Warms Up to Beijing." *Vancouver Sun*, April 20, 2009. <http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Canada+warms+Beijing/1513177/story.html>.
- Liu, Wei-jse. "Report on the Participation of the 2nd UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, May 11-25, 2003" [in Chinese]. Official Publications Echo Network. [http://open.nat.gov.tw/OpenFront/report/report\\_detail.jsp?sysId=C09204537](http://open.nat.gov.tw/OpenFront/report/report_detail.jsp?sysId=C09204537).
- Mackinnon, Mark. "Canada Resumes 'Quiet Diplomacy' with China." *Globe and Mail*, May 12, 2009. [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090512.wchina13/BNStory/International/?cid=al\\_gam\\_nletter\\_newsUp](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090512.wchina13/BNStory/International/?cid=al_gam_nletter_newsUp).
- Manthorpe, Jonathan. *Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- "Ottawa Asked to Support WHO Observer Status for Taiwan." *TECO News* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 5. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol5\\_No2.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol5_No2.pdf).
- Ou, Francisco. "Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 2nd Session (September 25, 2008)." Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=33802&ctNode=1027&mp=6>.
- Parod, Icyang. "Participation Report on the 14th UN Working Groups on Indigenous Populations" [in Chinese]. Council of Indigenous Peoples, [1996]. [http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail\\_EVALUATE.jsp?isSearch=&docid=PA000000001379&cateID=A000455&linkSelf=0&linkRoot=0&linkParent=0&url=](http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail_EVALUATE.jsp?isSearch=&docid=PA000000001379&cateID=A000455&linkSelf=0&linkRoot=0&linkParent=0&url=)
- Potter, Evan H. *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009.
- "Ralph Meehan Wins First Lady of Taiwan Career Award 2003." *TECO News* 6, no. 4 (2004): 8. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol6\\_No4.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol6_No4.pdf).
- Ronning, Chester. *A Memoir of China in Revolution*. New York: Pantheon, 1974.
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Canada, and Industry Canada. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Canada and the Department of Industry of Canada Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Anti-Spam Policies and Strategies" [in Chinese and English]. November 16, 2006. [http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/content.aspx?site\\_content\\_sn=1017&is\\_history=0](http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/content.aspx?site_content_sn=1017&is_history=0).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the Fields of Communications and Information Technologies between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada and the Department of Industry of Canada" [in Chinese, English and French]. July 12, 2007. [http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/content.aspx?site\\_content\\_sn=1018&is\\_history=0](http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/content.aspx?site_content_sn=1018&is_history=0).

- Taiwan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *The Republic of China Diplomatic Almanac* [in Chinese]. Taipei: the Ministry, 1992-96 (print); 1997-2007 (online at [http://www.mofa.gov.tw/web/web\\_UTF-8/almanac](http://www.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac)).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Taiwan's Request for WHO Participation." Taipei: the Ministry, 2009. <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9481029557.doc>.
- Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. "Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 5th Anniversary," 3. [http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/5th\\_anni/brochure/en/03.jpg](http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/5th_anni/brochure/en/03.jpg).
- "TECO Hosts Angel Foundation Launch." *TECO News* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 3. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol5\\_No2.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol5_No2.pdf).
- "TECO Hosts Breast Cancer Fundraiser." *TECO News* 6, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 10. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol6\\_No3.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol6_No3.pdf).
- "TECO Hosts Fall Fashion Show to Support Youth." *TECO News* 6, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 12. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol6\\_No3.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol6_No3.pdf).
- "TECO Hosts Local Charity Events in June." *TECO News* 6, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 5. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol6\\_No2.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol6_No2.pdf).
- "TECO Hosts Miss Canada." *TECO News* 5, no. 3&4 (Fall 2002): 15. [http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO\\_NEWS\\_Vol5\\_No3&4.pdf](http://www.taiwan-canada.org/doc/pdf/TECO_NEWS_Vol5_No3&4.pdf).
- Wheeler, Carolynne. "China Becomes the Great Wall of Stimulus." *Globe and Mail*, April 9, 2009. [http://business.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090409.wrchina10/BNStory/Business/?cid=al\\_gam\\_nletter\\_newsUp](http://business.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090409.wrchina10/BNStory/Business/?cid=al_gam_nletter_newsUp).
- Wu, Der-yuan. "Canada and the Global Diffusion of 'One China.'" In *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis*, edited by André Lecours, 319-40. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Institutional Development and Adaptability: Canada, Taiwan and the Social Construction of 'One China.'" PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 2001.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The International Constitution of "One China (Respective Representation)" and Its Impact: A Constructivist/Institutionalist Perspective* [in Chinese]. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 2009.
- Yi, Chi-chen. "Exemplar Persists Though the Philosopher Was Away: In Memory of Dr. Fang Chin-yen." In *Essays and Memoirs Dedicated to Ambassador Chin-yen Fang* [in Chinese], edited by Faye Fang-Hsu, 93-103. Taipei: privately printed, 2009.

## THE CIC CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS PROJECT

Bilateral relations between the governments of Canada and the People's Republic of China are a matter of strategic interest to Canada. Recent changes in the frequency of high-level visits, the effective style and content of bilateral communications and perspectives held about each country by various sectors of each other's society all suggest that the Canada-China relationship has changed significantly in recent years. Yet China remains vitally important to Canada for a variety of reasons and in a variety of sectors. Political and diplomatic cooperation on issues of direct bilateral concern and also on issues of global import remains critically important. Commercial and trade ties linking Canada with the world's third largest and fastest growing economy are of obvious importance. Cultural and civil society ties, including immigration patterns and the ancillary effects they generate, are also important. In these and other matters, the Canada-China relationship will likely grow in importance in the years to come. While the diversity of links between Canada and China militates in favour of giving due attention to a multiplicity of commercial, academic and civil society links, bilateral cooperation at the federal/central government level remains important.

In keeping with CIC objectives to advance research and dialogue on international affairs issues of importance and interest to Canadians, the CIC Canada-China Relations Project has focused on supporting research and analysis toward building a policy framework for Canada's relationship with China. The project's activities have been developed along three thematic areas that reflect issues of common concern: a) Chinese domestic institutional and normative contexts for engagement; b) Economic relations; c) Collaboration on global issues such as environment, health and security.

- a) **Domestic Context for Engagement:** The Canada-China relationship can be most effective when it is grounded on complementarity of interests, which in turn requires mutual understanding of domestic normative and institutional conditions in both countries. Canadian initiatives with China, ranging from WTO compliance and business regulation to human rights, can be effective only if they are designed and implemented in light of China's domestic conditions, ranging from popular norms to governmental structures and policy priorities. Similarly, China's success in nurturing productive relationships with Canada will require appreciation of Canadian domestic conditions. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Professor Jeremy Paltiel of Carleton University.
- b) **Economic Relations:** Economic relations between Canada and China are critically important. Economic relations include bilateral trade and investment relations, and also extend to local effects of economic conditions and behaviour. In the trade area, Canada's strengths match up extremely well with China's needs. In trade and investment relations, efforts to promote normative and institutional accommodation in China for Canadian business objectives are consistent with Chinese development policies and also serve important Canadian interests in the areas of good governance. As well, national economic behavior by the two countries in response to changing economic conditions at the global, regional and local level have important effects on the Canada-China relationship. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Yuen Pau Woo, President of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
- c) **Collaboration on Global Issues:** The importance of China's responsible participation in systems for addressing global policy concerns in areas such as environment, health and security cannot be overstated. Yet China's participation in the global community can be distorted by its responses to apprehension and competition from other global actors, particularly the United States, the European Union and Japan. Canada has a significant role to play in supporting China's responsible participation, not only through direct bilateral programming but also through our capacity to deploy good offices, legitimation and other soft power resources both bilaterally and globally. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Professor Brian Job of the University of British Columbia.

The papers here presented in connection with the CIC Canada-China Relations Project offer informed, non-partisan recommendations for a variety of stakeholders in Canada, including the government and private and public sector institutions and individuals, with a view toward furthering the development of healthy long-term relations between Canada and China. While historical and current conditions may result in disagreement as to how best to manage the Canada-China relationship, China's importance to the world requires our attention. We hope that the papers presented here can further the process of understanding and effective engagement that will strengthen the foundation for productive relations for the long-term interests of both countries.

**Dr. Pitman B. Potter**

*Chair*

*CIC China Working Group*

The Canadian International Council (CIC) is a non-partisan, nationwide council established to strengthen Canada's role in international affairs. With local branches nationwide, the CIC seeks to advance research, discussion and debate on international issues by supporting a Canadian foreign policy network that crosses academic disciplines, policy areas and economic sectors.

The CIC features a privately funded fellowship program and a network of issue-specific Working Groups. The goal of the CIC Working Groups is to identify major issues and challenges in their respective areas of study and to suggest and outline the best possible solutions to Canada's strategic foreign policy position on those issues. The CIC aims to generate rigorous foreign policy research and advice.

## CIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS

### Chair

Jim Balsillie, Co-CEO, Research In Motion

### Co-vice Chairs

Bill Graham, Chancellor of Trinity College and Chair, Atlantic Council of Canada

John MacNaughton, Chair of the Board, Business Development Bank of Canada

### Directors

Scott Burk, President, Wealhouse Capital Management

André Desmarais, President and Co-CEO, Power Corporation of Canada

Brian Flemming, Member, Halifax Branch, Canadian International Council

Edward Goldenberg, Partner, Bennett Jones LLP

Jennifer Jeffs, President, CIC

Tom Jenkins, Executive Chairman and CSO, Open Text

Pierre Marc Johnson, Senior Counsel, Heenan Blaikie LLP

Don Macnamara, Past President, Victoria Branch, Canadian International Council

Indira Samarasekera, President, University of Alberta

Janice Stein, Director, Munk Centre for International Studies

Jodi White, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs and Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs, Carleton University

45 Willcocks Street, Box 210  
Toronto Ontario M5S 1C7  
TEL: 416-977-9000, 1-800-668-2442  
FAX: 416-946-7319