Did al-Qaeda hijack the terrorism discourse?

For all their tragedy, Anders Breivik’s attacks in Oslo and Utøya offer an opportunity to reassess our conventional view about terrorism – a poorly defined term with tremendous political significance.

On the day of Breivik’s attacks, while Norwegian officials waited for evidence to emerge, two little known Islamic extremist groups took credit. Perhaps as a result of this precipitous, and ultimately false, attribution the events were immediately and widely reported as terrorist attacks.  But was this classification preordained? Not all acts of large scale violence are labeled terrorism.  Two recent attacks in the US – both with ostensibly political targets – have been treated markedly differently. The shooting on Fort Hood military base in 2009 which killed 14 people and wounded 29 was widely labeled terrorism.  Yet the shooting spree at a Congresswoman’s constituent meeting in Tucson earlier this year, in which six people were killed and 13 injured, including the Congresswoman herself, Gabrielle Giffords, was largely seen as the act of a mad man.

In the hours after the attacks in Norway, however, there was little ambiguity over whether they would be labeled as terrorism.  The Wall Street Journal editorial page audaciously claimed, “Norway certainly did not buy itself much grace from the jihadis for staying out of the Iraq war… Norway can do all this and more but in jihadist eyes it will forever remain guilty for being what it is.” The Washington Post’s Jennifer Rubin declared, “This is a sobering reminder for those who think it’s too expensive to wage a war against jihadists.”

James Fallows and Stephen Walt chastised Rubin and other ideologues for their failure to reserve judgment. But this wasn’t just a case of a few bad apples. That only 0.34% of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2009 were traced to Islamist groups did not deter a substantial proportion of the population from looking for the next bin Laden.

Almost two weeks after the attacks, there is debate as to whether Oslo should be seen as an arbitrary act of violence or a reflection of wider political and religious extremism. There is a convincing argument to be made that, by labeling it the former, we set a double-standard: Why is it that performance violence committed by Muslims is unequivocally considered terrorism, but the same acts committed by non-Muslims are not?

We asked professor of international affairs Stephen Walt, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer and terrorism expert Shane Brighton to weigh in on the extent to which the post-9/11 preoccupation with Islamic jihadism has distorted the discourse on terrorism.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Walt, in line with his “balance-of-threat” theory, wrote that terrorism represented a reaction to US primacy. The solution, he argued, was for the US to reduce its appearance as a threat. Unsurprisingly, he did not support the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  We ask Walt to what extent terrorism is defined by the political responses to attacks, rather than by the attacks themselves. Why are the events in Oslo considered terrorist acts, when the Columbine shooting was not?

Juergensmeyer has claimed of terrorism that “the public response to violence… is part of the meaning of the term.” If the public, rather than attackers themselves, defines an attack as terrorist, what do our reactions to Olso tell us?

If the definition of the terrorist act is provided by us – rather than the party committing the act – then what do our reactions to the Oslo attacks tell us?  Moreover, what makes Breivik a “Christian terrorist,” as Juergensmeyer has termed him? Why is it that modern terrorism is so often seen through the lens of religion?

Brighton disagrees with Juergensmeyer, comparing Breivik’s methodology to that of 19^th century anarchists and the Unabomber. After the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, Brighton criticized the Blair government for misinterpreting certain British Muslims’ legitimate condemnation of British involvement in the Iraq war for radicalization. Brighton makes the case that the tendency to over-identify political conflict with one set of actors has led to a myopic view of radicalization and the terrorism that accompanies it.

There are few terms as opprobrious and, for some, empowering as “terrorist.” Yet there are few terms as dynamic and subject to redefinition. As we try to make sense of what happened in Norway, we would be remiss not to evaluate the evolving significance of “terrorism.”

An interview with Stephen Walt:

An interview with Mark Juergensmeyer:

An Interview with Shane Brighton:

To what extent has the post-9/11 preoccupation with Islamic jihadism distorted the discourse on terrorism?

Shane Brighton: Too much public discourse in western states focuses on Islamic militancy in a way that over-stresses its otherness. The “civilizational” dimension of jihadi ideology has been accepted and reproduced in a largely unconsidered, uncritical way, and this has been reflected in media discussions, politicians’ public statements, and government policy. A number of distortions have followed. To offer one example, the terms “radicalization” and “radicalized” (which have very specific meanings within the intelligence communities) have taken on a life of their own in public discourse, being applied indiscriminately to any Muslim who is politicized and criticizes western foreign policy. The problem is that this over-identifies political conflict with only one set of actors, and the plural, interactive nature of radicalization is missed: Aspects of government policy and other political elements (such as the far right) have been undergoing their own radicalization processes, not just Islamic militants. While these processes are, to some degree, internal to the specific actors, they have significant implications for the others

Will Anders Breivik’s attacks in Oslo and Utøya alter the way we make sense of terrorism? Will they alter the way governments conceive of terrorism and, more broadly, threats?

SB: It certainly should. Finally – and rather too late – the excessive generality and counter-productiveness of counter-radicalization policy in the U.K. has been recognized with the Contest II changes and, more recently, the Prevent Review.

Breivik’s big innovation is a political/strategic one: the idea that, if you want to attack minority communities, you should hit the “host” population, in the expectation that your real target will be denied public sympathy and at least part of the backlash you create will be against it. Unfortunately, the seriousness with which some of Breivik’s ideas are being discussed in the media and blogosphere seem to affirm the effectiveness of this strategy.

Beyond this, some concepts already in circulation have gained a new relevance. For example, the idea of the “super-empowered individual” who takes advantage of the availability of materials and information in western societies to launch highly destructive attacks without much organizational back-up. The point is that, with global media coverage and a sufficiently spectacular attack, one individual or a very small group can create a global effect.

In what way does Breivik’s brand of terrorism share similarities with the terrorism of al-Qaeda and like-minded groups? Does our understanding of one shed light on our understanding of the other?

SB: Beyond an appetite for mass-fatality attacks and, arguably, a recognition that this is needed to achieve a transnational impact, I don’t see much direct correlation with al-Qaeda-type groups. The desire to stand trial and make post-attack statements, for example, is more reminiscent of 19^th-century anarchist groups. Breivik’s written “manifesto” statements, meanwhile, are more reminiscent of the Unabomber than of al-Qaeda-type martyrdom statements.

As indicated above, we might want to reconsider the modelling of “radicalization” to take into account the relations between different elements, and the impact of events across transnational communities, which interpret things in different ways. This is important because the forms of “self-radicalization” and “self-starter” individuals and groups may well increase if Breivik’s appeal to the far right is successful. Here, at least, there might be some transferable benefits from the way in which al-Qaeda has been understood.

Photo Courtesy Reuters.