An Interview with Shane Brighton

Will Anders Breivik’s attacks in Oslo and Utøya alter the way we make sense of terrorism? Will they alter the way governments conceive of terrorism and, more broadly, threats?

SB: It certainly should. Finally – and rather too late – the excessive generality and counter-productiveness of counter-radicalization policy in the U.K. has been recognized with the Contest II changes and, more recently, the Prevent Review. (details on various U.K. gov. websites).

Breivik’s big innovation is a political/strategic one: the idea that, if you want to attack minority communities, you should hit the “host” population, in the expectation that your real target will be denied public sympathy and at least part of the backlash you create will be against it. Unfortunately, the seriousness with which some of Breivik’s ideas are being discussed in the media and blogosphere seem to affirm the effectiveness of this strategy.

Beyond this, some concepts already in circulation have gained a new relevance. For example, the idea of the “super-empowered individual” who takes advantage of the availability of materials and information in western societies to launch highly destructive attacks without much organizational back-up. The point is that, with global media coverage and a sufficiently spectacular attack, one individual or a very small group can create a global effect.

In what way does Breivik’s brand of terrorism share similarities with the terrorism of al-Qaeda and like-minded groups? Does our understanding of one shed light on our understanding of the other?

SB: Beyond an appetite for mass-fatality attacks and, arguably, a recognition that this is needed to achieve a transnational impact, I don’t see much direct correlation with al-Qaeda-type groups. The desire to stand trial and make post-attack statements, for example, is more reminiscent of 19^th-century anarchist groups. Breivik’s written “manifesto” statements, meanwhile, are more reminiscent of the Unabomber than of al-Qaeda-type martyrdom statements.

As indicated above, we might want to reconsider the modelling of “radicalization” to take into account the relations between different elements, and the impact of events across transnational communities, which interpret things in different ways. This is important because the forms of “self-radicalization” and “self-starter” individuals and groups may well increase if Breivik’s appeal to the far right is successful. Here, at least, there might be some transferable benefits from the way in which al-Qaeda has been understood.