A Defence of Assassination

Do you advocate the targeted assassination of suspected terrorists?

Michael Rubin: Yes, I have publicly advocated targeted assassination since before it was popular to do so. Especially with surgical strikes against individuals, it is possible to avoid further bloodshed. Humanitarian-law proponents and the anti-war crowd may not like it, but targeted assassination is legal under international law. 

Since writing your article, “An Arrow in Our Quiver: Why the U.S. Government Should Consider Assassination” in 2006, do you think the “gut-level revulsion to assassination” has declined? 

MR: Yes, at least within the United States, they have, as President Obama has embraced a strategy heavy on targeting individuals from unmanned Predator aircraft or surgical strike teams like that which killed Osama bin Laden. If assassination was most noxious to the progressive left, the fact that a president they supported embraced the strategy has permanently nullified what otherwise would have been a staunchly partisan issue. President Obama himself likely had to reconcile himself to an approach he initially opposed. But once he sat in a position of leadership, he quickly came to understand that targeted killing was the best way to achieve an objective while minimizing civilian or collateral damage.

Stephanie Carvin disagrees with Michael Rubin. See Why.

Assassination is clearly more effective when used by weak states or non-state actors than when it is used by strong states. Why is it in the United States’ interest, then, to normalize assassination? 

MR: Assassination is simply one tactic among many. The United States has wielded it only against imminent threats or at times of war. Certainly I recognize arguments whose world views embrace moral equivalence can make this rationalization: If the United States can assassinate rogue leaders or those it considers terrorists, why can’t small countries assassinate those who their leaders believe are equally culpable? Indeed, if they want to involve themselves in conflict with the United States, they will. Saddam Hussein, after all, tried unsuccessfully to assassinate George H.W. Bush during the former president’s visit to Kuwait. Bill Clinton responded to that action with cruise missiles and, for a few years at least, Saddam understood that tit-for-tat action was not in his interest.

Do you think we could have achieved the same outcome – with fewer civilian casualties – had we simply assassinated Gadhafi?

MR: Simply put, yes. Gadhafi was not only head of state, but he was also a military leader. All major decisions – including war crimes and indiscriminate attacks against civilians – came through him and his immediate family. Perhaps if leaders like Gadhafi understand they personally might pay the price for their decisions, they would reconsider setting their countries down certain courses.

ON KIDNAPPING:

“Terrorists crave an audience.” Has the expansion of mainstream and social media made kidnapping a more impactful terrorist tactic, since these media amplify kidnapping stories worldwide?

MR: Anything that prolongs the story makes terrorism more successful. Certainly, the 24-hour cable or satellite news cycle keeps the story alive. I grew up against the backdrop of the Iran hostage crisis: Perhaps Twitter is simply the 21^st-century equivalent of tying a yellow ribbon around a lamppost.

Your analysis has shown that negotiating with terrorists breeds terrorism. Should states consider it best practice to ignore a hostage situation? Should they discourage news media from covering kidnappings?

MR: States shouldn’t ignore hostage situations, but they should not pay ransom to resolve them. For the hostage-takers, it boils down to a cost-benefit analysis. For the victims’ government, the question is how to raise the money to pay off the terrorist group. 

This essay is part of OpenCanada’s How We Fight series.

Photo courtesy of Reuters.